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Outstanding Constitutional and 
International Law Issues Raised by the 
United States-Puerto Rico Relationship 
Juan R. Torruella† 
This Article touches upon some issues of fundamental im-
portance to the several million nationally disenfranchised 
United States citizens that reside in Puerto Rico. I write with a 
modicum of uneasiness as a result of the uncertain terrain on 
which the United States-Puerto Rico relationship presently 
finds itself, firstly, by reason of two cases that are pending reso-
lution by the Supreme Court of the United States—Puerto Rico 
v. Sánchez Valle1 and the consolidated cases of Puerto Rico v. 
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust2 and Acosta-Febo v. Frank-
lin California Tax-Free Trust3—which have already been ar-
gued and are awaiting decision, and secondly, because Con-
gress is now considering legislation entitled the “Puerto Rico 
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act,” referred 
to by the uncomfortably inapt acronym “PROMESA”—
“promise” in Spanish—pursuant to which the Government of 
Puerto Rico will be placed in virtual trusteeship by the U.S. 
government. 
Each of these cases and this legislation hold the potential 
to drastically change the U.S.-P.R. scenario depending on 
which of several paths the Court chooses to take in resolving 
the basic questions the cases raise, and what it is that Congress 
 
†  Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The author recog-
nizes the assistance of Rebecca Pilar Buckwalter-Poza and takes full, sole re-
sponsibility for the views expressed herein. Copyright © 2016 by Judge Juan 
R. Torruella.  
 1. Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 192 D.P.R. 594 (P.R. 2015), petition for 
cert. filed, 2015 WL 4498867 (U.S. July 17, 2015) (No. 15-108). 
 2. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 
2015), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 5117977 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2015) (No. 15-
233). 
 3. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 
2015), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 5117977 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2015) (No. 15-
255). 
  
80 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [100:79 
 
eventually enacts to “assist” the people of Puerto Rico. The final 
product of the cases could run a gamut of results. What Con-
gress will produce is anyone’s guess, but judging from the so-
called “discussion draft” of PROMESA, it does not appear that 
Puerto Rico is about to be released from the colonial grip of the 
plenary powers that were authorized by the Insular Cases.4 Ra-
ther, it seems that Congress may tighten this grip to a virtual 
stranglehold. This Article addresses several matters that may 
serve as background when these cases are decided and Con-
gress passes legislation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION: A PRESENTLY PROBLEMATIC STATE 
OF AFFAIRS   
Even as we proceed well into the twenty-first century and 
this country actively promotes our democracy to the rest of the 
world, we unfortunately do not always practice what we 
preach. This is particularly true with reference to the constitu-
tional and political rights of those who reside in our various 
outlying non-state jurisdictions, in areas which we euphemisti-
cally refer to as “territories” or “possessions,” when they are, de 
facto and de jure, colonies. There should be no question about 
this asseveration as regards to American Samoa, Guam, or the 
U.S. Virgin Islands, for which as recently as January 13th of 
this year, the United States filed reports as required by Article 
73(e) of the United Nations Charter, part of the U.N. Declara-
tion Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories.5 
 
 4. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetz v. United States, 182 
U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. 
United States,182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); 
Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).  
 5. “Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibili-
ties for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a 
full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of 
the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred 
trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of interna-
tional peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of 
the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end: . . . (e) to transmit regu-
larly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limita-
tion as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and 
other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educa-
tional conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible 
other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.” U.N. Char-
ter art. 73(e); see U.N. Secretary-General, Information from Non-Self-
Governing Territories Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter of the 
United Nations: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/71/68 (Feb. 1, 
2016), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/68. 
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Although the United States ceased filing these reports for 
Puerto Rico in 1952 following representations to the United 
Nations to the effect that Puerto Rico had become a self-
governing entity by reason of the establishment of the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, these avowals did not represent the 
true legal or constitutional situation when they were made, nor 
have they become any more true at any time since then to the 
present.6 Any doubt as to the veracity of this assertion may be 
dispelled by consulting the amicus brief filed by the Solicitor 
General on behalf of the United States before the Supreme 
Court in Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, in which the United 
States argues that the approval of self-government for Puerto 
Rico in 1952 did not change Puerto Rico’s fundamental consti-
tutional status as a U.S. territory subject to the paramount au-
thority of Congress under the Territorial Clause.7  
A perhaps even more poignant and present example of 
Congress’s colonial control and relationship to Puerto Rico lies 
with the proposed PROMESA legislation, which, among other 
things, would establish a so-called “Oversight Board,” a non-
elected entity of seven members appointed by the President.8 
This Board will have the power to impose a deadline on the 
Government of Puerto Rico for developing a fiscal plan and 
budget that meet Congress’s criteria—as well as the right to re-
ject Puerto Rico’s proposals and substitute its own instead.9 
Puerto Rico will not be represented on the Oversight Board: 
Unlike the previous version of the legislation, which suggested 
that at least two of the then-five members of the Board must 
already live or have a primary place of business in Puerto Rico 
to be appointed, the version introduced in the House on April 
12, 2016 only requires that one member “shall maintain a pri-
mary residence . . . or have a primary place of business” in 
Puerto Rico, leaving open the possibility of filling this slot with 
anyone willing to move to Puerto Rico to satisfy that criterion.10 
 
 6. See JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: 
THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 133–67 (1985); JOSÉ TRÍAS 
MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD 
121–22 (1997); see also Juan R. Torruella, Hacia dónde vas Puerto Rico?, 107 
YALE L.J. 1503, 1514–18 (1998) (reviewing MONGE, supra).  
 7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 16–19, Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, No. 15-108 (Dec. 23, 2015) (citing 
Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354 (1907)). 
 8. H.R. 4900, 114th Cong. § 101(e)(1) (draft introduced Apr. 12, 2016).  
 9. Id. § 201. 
 10. Id. § 101(e)(2). 
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Although the Governor is nominally part of the Board, he is on-
ly an “ex officio” member without any voting rights.11 The legis-
lation also gives the Board the prerogative to demand any in-
formation and documentation it believes may be relevant from 
the Government of Puerto Rico12 and requires the Puerto Rico 
legislature to submit all acts it passes, along with estimates of 
their cost, to the Oversight Board for evaluation in short or-
der.13 If the Board determines that an act is not consistent with 
the approved fiscal plan, it may unilaterally dictate that the act 
be changed or simply overrule the Government of Puerto Rico 
to block its enforcement or application.14 The Board may also 
require the Government of Puerto Rico to submit all contracts 
and leases to the Board for approval.15 And, of course, Puerto 
Rico will also have to get the Board’s approval before it can “is-
sue debt or guarantee, exchange, modify, repurchase, redeem, 
or enter into similar transactions with respect to its debt.”16  
Of course, this is not PROMESA’s only egregious 
stipulation. Tucked into the legislation is another provision 
that is perhaps even more pernicious to Puerto Rico and its 
people’s future, given the Island’s limited land and natural re-
sources. Section 405 would open up thousands of acres of pro-
tected land to private development by permitting the Secretary 
of the Interior to convey it to Puerto Rico to sell.17 Even the Sec-
retary of the Interior has condemned this provision.18 
The PROMESA legislation is just the latest chapter in 
Puerto Rico’s interminable colonial tutelage. There is more 
damning evidence throughout history of the United States’ hold 
over Puerto Rico. Review of this evidence and relationship 
demonstrates that Puerto Rico’s present woes were not only 
foreseeable but inevitable given the social, economic, and politi-
cal processes to which Puerto Rico and its inhabitants have 
been subjected under the sovereignty of the United States.  
 
 
 11. Id. § 101(e)(3). 
 12. Id. § 104(c)(2). 
 13. Id. § 204(a)(1)–(2). 
 14. Id. § 204(a)(5). 
 15. Id. § 204(b)(2). 
 16. Id. § 207. 
 17. Id. § 405. 
 18. Danica Coto, US Official Warns Puerto Rico Resources Targeted Amid 
Crisis, YAHOO (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-interior 
-secretary-visits-puerto-rico-unveil-project-151937605.html. 
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II.  THE TRAGIC TRANSITION TO U.S. SOVEREIGNTY 
AND ITS SEQUELAE   
The story of Puerto Rico’s present condition begins, in 
truth, with the Treaty of Paris of 1898, which ended the Span-
ish-American War. In providing for the cession of Puerto Rico 
from Spain to the United States, the Treaty stated in Article IX 
that “[t]he civil rights and political status of the native inhabit-
ants . . . shall be determined by the Congress.”19 This provision 
was contrary to the unwavering practice and prevalent consti-
tutional law up to then regarding all other territorial acquisi-
tions by the United States. In all prior cases, upon acquiring 
additional territory, U.S. citizenship and rights were granted to 
the inhabitants of the newly acquired lands, irrespective of the 
means used to add those territories to the nation’s domain.20  
The new practice instituted after the Spanish-American 
War effected not only a departure from past practice by the 
United States but a retrogression from how things were in 
Puerto Rico during Spanish rule, under which the Island was a 
province of Spain (the equivalent of a state under the U.S. form 
of government), and Puerto Ricans were full Spanish citizens 
with the right to elect sixteen delegates and three senators to 
the Spanish Cortes (the equivalent of our Congress).21  
Shortly after his arrival at the head of the invading forces 
General Miles had proclaimed to the Puerto Rican population 
that the United States would “promote [their] prosperity and 
 
 19. Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the King-
dom of Spain, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 [hereinafter 
Treaty of Paris].  
 20. For example, after the Mexican-American War, just fifty years before, 
residents of the newly acquired territory were given the choice between declar-
ing a preference to retain Mexican citizenship and automatically becoming 
U.S. citizens by staying in the territory for one year. See Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, U.S.-Mex., art. VIII, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922; Mae M. Ngai, Birth-
right Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2527 
(2007). 
 21. FERNANDO BAYRÓN TORO, HISTORIA DE LAS ELECCIONES Y LOS 
PARTIDOS POLITICOS DE PUERTO RICO 3 (1977); see 330 GACETA DE MADRID 
Tomo IV 625, 625 (Nov. 26, 1897) (Sp.) (publication of decree providing for 
Spanish residents of the Antilles the same rights as the inhabitants of the 
Spanish peninsula); Real Decreto, 298 GACETA DE PUERTO RICO 2, 2–3 (Dec. 
16, 1897) (Sp.) (Title I through IV of decree); Real Decreto (Continuación), 299 
GACETA DE PUERTO RICO 1, 1–2 (Dec. 17, 1897) (Sp.) (Title V through title 
VIII); Real Decreto (Conclusión), 300 GACETA DE PUERTO RICO 1, 1 (Dec. 18, 
1897) (Sp.) (Title IX through end); see also REPORT OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH AN-
NUAL MEETING OF THE LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE OF FRIENDS OF THE 
INDIAN AND OTHER DEPENDENT PEOPLES 176 (1908). 
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bestow the immunities and blessings of [U.S. enlightenment] 
and the liberal institutions of our Government.”22 The United 
States instead imposed a military regime that abolished all 
forms of democratic representation in local government. Fur-
thermore, despite Miles’s bombastic promises, the colonial pow-
ers negotiated the Treaty of Paris and enacted Article IX with-
out Puerto Rican participation or even consultation. The treaty 
and its Article IX were announced to Puerto Rico’s inhabitants 
as a fait accompli, in which they were stripped of their Spanish 
citizenship and rights and required to give allegiance to a new 
colonial overseer under whom they would be without any rights 
except those that Congress, in which they had no vote, chose to 
grant in the future. As a matter of American constitutional law, 
Article IX was clearly unconstitutional, for as Justice Kennedy 
stated in Boumediene v. Bush, “[t]he Constitution grants Con-
gress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and 
govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its 
terms apply.”23 It does not take a rocket scientist to conclude 
that neither the Treaty of Paris nor any treaty can trump, so to 
speak, the Constitution by granting Congress powers that ex-
ceed those allowed by that document.  
Unfortunately, however, the negotiation of the Treaty of 
Paris and its implementation coincided with a period of imperi-
alist euphoria. The dominant political figures in the United 
States were enthusiastic exponents of the concept of Manifest 
Destiny, which promoted American exceptionalism and the ex-
pectation that the United States, “thanks to the superior quali-
ties of the Anglo-Saxons . . . and to their democratic institu-
tions, would inevitably absorb their neighbours [sic].”24 
The United States was not writing on a clean slate. What 
the United States could constitutionally do with territories it 
acquired had been categorically established by the Supreme 
Court back in 1856. In the much maligned (for other reasons) 
Dred Scott v. Sandford case, Chief Justice Roger Taney had 
written: 
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal 
Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the Unit-
ed States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleas-
ure; nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the ad-
 
 22. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY TO 
THE SECRETARY OF WAR 31–32 (1898). 
 23. 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008). 
 24. HUGH THOMAS, CUBA, OR THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM 211 (1971). 
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mission of new States . . . . [N]o power is given to acquire a Territory 
to be held and governed permanently [in a colonial] character.25 
Perhaps equally important, the Sandford Court went on to 
rule that the Territorial Clause in Article IV of the Constitu-
tion26 was not applicable to territories acquired after the U.S.’s 
independence from Great Britain. Chief Judge Taney held that 
the Territorial Clause was only relevant to those lands held at 
the time of the treaty with Great Britain in 1783,27 namely the 
Old Northwest Territories,28 but did not apply to land acquired 
thereafter. The Court further ruled in 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed equal rights 
to “all persons within the territorial jurisdiction [of the United 
States], without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of 
nationality.”29 But these rulings, this vital precedent, would be 
disregarded. 
Historian Rubin Francis Weston cogently describes what 
actually happened in the political arena of the times in his 
book, Racism in U.S. Imperialism: 
Those who advocated overseas expansion faced this dilemma: What 
kind of relationship would the new peoples have to the body politic? 
Was it to be the relationship of the Reconstruction period, an attempt 
at political equality for dissimilar races, or was it to be the Southern 
“counterrevolutionary” point of view which denied the basic American 
constitutional rights to people of color? The actions of the federal gov-
ernment during the imperial period and the relegation of the Negro to 
a status of second-class citizenship indicated that the Southern point 
of view would prevail. The racism which caused the relegation of the 
Negro to a status of inferiority was to be applied to the overseas pos-
sessions of the United States.30 
The advent of this racially charged imperialistic mania in-
stigated the sharp departure from the past practice to which 
this Article earlier alluded.  
 
 25. 60 U.S. 393, 446 (1856) (emphasis added). 
 26. “The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful 
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to 
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to 
prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state.” U.S. 
CONST. art IV, § 3. 
 27. See Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America 
and His Britannic Majesty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. 
 28. 60 U.S. at 446–47; see Northwest Ordinance of 1789, 1 Stat. 50, 51 
(1789). 
 29. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (emphasis added). 
 30. RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLU-
ENCE OF RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1893–1946, at 
15 (1972) (footnotes omitted). 
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The transition was not without dissent. The 1899 report of 
the Carroll Commission, appointed by President McKinley to 
investigate prevailing conditions in Puerto Rico, concluded that 
there should be “no hesitation in affirming that the people [of 
Puerto Rico] have good claims to be considered capable of self-
government.”31 Unfortunately, the military governor of Puerto 
Rico, General Davis, challenged the Commission’s recommen-
dations, stating that “[t]he people [of Puerto Rico] generally 
have no conception of political rights combined with political 
responsibilities.”32  
An acrimonious debate in Congress followed, and that body 
sided with General Davis. The decision was greatly influenced 
by considerations of how a progressive resolution of Puerto Ri-
co’s case could affect the companion bill dealing with the Phil-
ippines, as to which one senator warned that we should “be-
ware of those mongrels of the East, with breath of pestilence 
and touch of leprosy.”33 With this pernicious atmosphere as 
background, Congress proceeded to enact the Foraker Act of 
1900.34 Through this Act, Congress accomplished its two most 
pressing goals: creating a colonial apparatus to replace the mil-
itary regime that had ruled Puerto Rico since its invasion and 
raising money to fund this new administration.  
This statute provided for the establishment of a civil gov-
ernment composed of a presidentially appointed governor, a 
supreme court, and an upper legislative body, with a lower 
house elected by the Puerto Ricans.35 Importantly, it also estab-
lished a tax on goods imported into Puerto Rico from the main-
land United States, the proceeds of which would be used to de-
fray the expenses of the newly established territorial 
government.36 Because such a tax was alleged to violate the 
uniformity provision of the Taxing and Spending Clause of the 
 
 31. HENRY K. CARROLL, REPORT ON THE ISLAND OF PORTO RICO, SPECIAL 
COMMISSION FOR THE UNITED STATES ON PORTO RICO 56–58 (U.S. GOVERN-
MENT PRINTING OFFICE 1899). 
 32. GEORGE W. DAVIS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT: RE-
PORT OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF PORTO RICO ON CIVIL AFFAIRS, VOL. 1, 
PT. 13, at 19–20 (U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1900). 
 33. 33 CONG. REC. 3616 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1900) (statement of Sen. Bate); 
see also id. at 3613. 
 34. 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (described as “[a]n Act Temporarily to provide reve-
nues and a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes”). 
 35. Id. at 81–84. 
 36. Id. at 78. 
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Constitution,37 it was challenged as unconstitutional, and thus 
came about the Insular Cases,38 which presented the Supreme 
Court with the opportunity to define the relationship between 
the United States and Puerto Rico—and determine Congress’s 
power over the latter. 
The Supreme Court, which was almost to a man the same 
Court that had validated racial segregation in the South in 
Plessy v. Ferguson,39 just five years before in 1896, harked the 
imperialists’ clarion call, and answered with rulings that en-
dorsed their undemocratic ideology and licensed Congress’s ef-
forts to realize its ideals in its governance of the United States’ 
new colonial empire.  
The Supreme Court not only totally ignored the controlling 
precedent of Loughborough v. Blake,40 decided in 1820, which 
had unqualifiedly determined that the proscription against 
non-uniformity in taxation applied to the territories—in that 
case, the District of Columbia—but, in a perhaps an even more 
opprobrious action, side-stepped the explicit and unambiguous 
constitutional precept pronounced by Chief Judge Taney 
unequivocally prohibiting the establishment or maintenance of 
colonies by the United States. Instead of following these prece-
dents, the Court gave its benediction to the creation by Con-
gress of an American colonial system under the guise of some-
thing invented by the Court out of thin air, the so-called 
doctrine of territorial incorporation. Pursuant to this theory, 
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, as denizens of an “unincorpo-
rated territory,” were to be denied all but the most fundamen-
tal constitutional protections and Congress was granted almost 
unlimited plenary powers. The so-called PROMESA congres-
sional proposal is only the latest example of how Congress still 
exercises these powers over the unincorporated territories and 
their inhabitants. There have been many other manifestations 
throughout the 116 years of U.S. colonial rule established by 
the Insular Cases.  
Puerto Rico’s status has not changed an iota over this peri-
od, nor has that of its citizens. Just five years after Puerto Ri-
 
 37. That clause concludes, “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1.  
 38. See supra note 4. 
 39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 40. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820). 
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cans were granted U.S. citizenship in 1917,41 the Supreme 
Court ruled, quite incredibly, in Balzac v. Porto Rico,42 that all 
the granting of U.S. citizenship meant for Puerto Ricans was 
that they could move to the Mainland and there exercise full 
rights as citizens, but that they were not entitled to the full 
rights of U.S. citizens while residing in Puerto Rico—such as, 
in the Balzac case, the right to trial by jury.  
If another ludicrous example of this proposition is needed, 
consider the author—a U.S. Court of Appeals judge, sitting on 
the second-highest court of the United States, voting and decid-
ing cases that have national import—who, because he resides 
in Puerto Rico, where he was born and has roots, cannot vote 
for President or Vice President or claim representation in the 
legislative body that passes the laws that govern and touch 
every facet of life in Puerto Rico. Forgetting, for a moment, all 
concepts of equal protection, due process, or even fairness, does 
this make any sense?  
III.  THE COLONIAL CONDITION THAT CAUSED PUERTO 
RICO’S PRESENT CRISIS   
The term “colony” is defined by UNESCO’s Dictionary of 
the Social Sciences as “a territory, subordinate in various 
ways—political, cultural, or economic—to a more developed 
country [in which] [s]upreme legislative power and much of the 
administration rest[s] with the controlling country, which [is] 
usually of a different ethnic group from the colony.”43 One 
would have to be seriously impaired in every sense to conclude 
that this definition does not fit the U.S.-P.R. relationship like a 
glove. 
This irrefutable colonial condition, the direct result of the 
Insular Cases and the regime that they legalized, continues to 
dictate the fate of the Island and its inhabitants today.44 Any 
attempt to divest or bypass this denigrating status as the cause 
for its present predicament is at best delusive. It is the fore-
runner, underlying cause, and current catalyst of the economic 
debacle in which Puerto Rico finds itself, for it has enabled, if 
not promoted, significant and ongoing economic exploitation by 
 
 41. Jones Act (Puerto Rico), Pub. L. No. 64-368, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 
951–52 (1917) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 737 (1994)). 
 42. 258 U.S. 298 (1922). 
 43. A DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 102 (Julius Gould & William 
Kolb eds., 1964). 
 44. See generally MONGE, supra note 6. 
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American capital to the detriment of Puerto Rico and its citi-
zens—since day one. 
The years between 1900 and 1945 may be referred to as 
the crypto-plantation period. Prior to that, towards the end of 
the Spanish regime, coffee had been Puerto Rico’s principal 
crop. Coffee acreage was twice that planted with sugar cane, 
more than ninety percent of farms were worked by those who 
owned them, and these farms averaged five acres in size.45 
Then, by 1900, Puerto Rico became one huge sugar plantation, 
mostly exploited by mega-enterprises from the Mainland, the 
largest of which were based in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and 
New York.46 Sugar cane acreage almost tripled from what it 
was in 1896,47 and, by 1917, a relatively small number of indi-
viduals, partnerships, and corporations owned almost all of the 
arable lowland of Puerto Rico.48 The Island’s economy and pop-
ulation became totally dependent on that one crop, with the 
raw sugar cane being turned into molasses and shipped in bulk 
to the Mainland for refinement into table sugar.49  
These sugar giants produced dividends as high as 115% on 
investment,50 with the four largest boasting an average return 
on investment between 1923 and 1930 of 22.5%.51 Three of the-
se sugar growers distributed more than $60 million in divi-
dends to their stockholders between 1920 and 1935—more than 
$1 billion in today’s dollars.52 The vast majority of the earnings 
produced from the work of the local labor left Puerto Rico, nev-
er to be seen again.  
 
 45. See DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE, SAN JUAN, ANNUAL 
BOOK ON STATISTICS OF PUERTO RICO, FISCAL YEAR 1947–48, at 282 tbl.139 
(1948); see also ARTURO MORALES CARRIÓN, PUERTO RICO: A POLITICAL AND 
CULTURAL HISTORY 137 (1983). 
 46. See MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 174. The Central Aguirre 
Sugar Company, a Massachusetts trust, was at times the largest sugar com-
pany in the world. That connection to Massachusetts is most likely the reason 
why Puerto Rico was placed in the First Circuit. 
 47. Id. at 217. 
 48. Id. at 216–17; see also BAILEY W. DIFFIE & JUSTINE WHITFIELD 
DIFFIE, PORTO RICO: A BROKEN PLEDGE 46–50 (1931); Judd Polk, The Plight of 
Puerto Rico, 57 POL. SCI. Q. 481, 482–503 (1942). 
 49. The various Sugar Acts, among other things, assigned production quo-
tas to various sugar-producing areas with which Puerto Rico was unable to 
compete economically. 
 50. MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 217. 
 51. JAMES L. DIETZ, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF PUERTO RICO: INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE AND CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 110 (1986). 
 52. Id. 
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The crypto-plantation period created a large landless popu-
lation, which lived below the poverty level, barely above sub-
sistence requirements. The rural population was eighty percent 
landless.53 Although between 1915 and 1925 wages in the sugar 
industry went up from 60 cents per day to $1.00 per day, the 
cost of a minimum family diet in the sugar producing areas was 
55.5 cents per day.54  
The Puerto Rican sugar industry, despite paying its work 
force miserably low wages, could not compete with other sugar-
producing areas without substantial assistance from the feder-
al government. This sugar-related dependence on federal aid 
was the beginning of a pattern of reliance on federal crutches of 
various kinds that increased exponentially, becoming a “per-
manent” feature of the Puerto Rican economy and eventually 
contributing to its collapse. 
In 1930, the annual per capita income in Puerto Rico was 
one-fifth that of the Mainland, just $122.55 Over the next three 
years, it shrank to just $85 as a result of the Great Depres-
sion.56 In the face of near-famine conditions, and with agricul-
tural work limited to only part of the year,57 the landless rural 
population flocked to the cities, particularly to San Juan.58 
Huge slums emerged, with as many as 100,000 people living in 
dismal conditions,59 totally overpowering the ability of local 
government to provide aid or respite. As described by one 
Stateside observer: 
I saw, in short, misery, disease, squalor, filth. It would be lamentable 
enough to see this anywhere . . . . But to see it on American territory, 
among people whom the United States has governed since 1898, in a 
region for which our federal responsibility has been complete for 43 
 
 53. MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 243. The rural population consti-
tuted nearly seventy percent of Puerto Rico’s population of almost 1,900,000 at 
the time. Id. 
 54. SAKARI SARIOLA, THE PUERTO RICAN DILEMMA 92 (1979). The average 
male worker in the United States earned approximately $1.88 per day in 1915. 
The Life of American Workers in 1915, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS (Feb. 2016), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article/the-life-of-american-workers-in-1915 
.htm#_ednref81.  
 55. MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 243. 
 56. Id. 
 57. The field workers, who constituted the great majority of those em-
ployed in the sugar industry, could only find work during the four or five 
months of the year that the harvesting of sugar cane took place.  
 58. Marjorie Ruth Clark, Our Own Puerto Rico, 4 ANTIOCH REV. 383, 389 
(1944). 
 59. Id. 
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years, is a paralyzing jolt to anyone who believes in American stand-
ards of progress and civilization.60  
Food for thought, given the present circumstances.  
From 1898 to 1933, the United States spent less than 
three-quarters of a million dollars in Puerto Rico per year.61 
Over the same period, American private enterprise converted 
Puerto Rico into a captive market. By 1910, nearly all of Puerto 
Rico’s exports went to the Mainland,62 a pattern that has hardly 
changed to this day.63 By the 1940s, Puerto Rico would be one of 
the United States’ top customers as well as one of its top sup-
pliers of raw goods.64 The sugar-era pattern persisted, with 
raw-materials exports produced by the colony exchanged for 
finished-goods imports from the metropolis, promoting an in-
creasingly negative balance of payments against the colonial 
side.65  
As if that were not enough, the Merchant Marine Act of 
1920, also called the Jones Act,66 requires all maritime cargo 
transported between the Island and the Mainland to be carried 
on U.S.-built ships, manned by U.S. crews, both of which are 
the most expensive in the maritime field.67 This, of course, re-
sults in raising the cost of everything shipped to and from 
Puerto Rico, including food stuffs and other essentials, and 
places goods produced in Puerto Rico at a competitive disad-
vantage.68 To this day, it costs twice as much to ship goods from 
 
 60. JOHN GUNTHER, INSIDE LATIN AMERICA 423 (1941). 
 61. Clark, supra note 58, at 388. 
 62. MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 173. 
 63. Puerto Rico Trade, Exports and Imports, ECONOMY WATCH (Mar. 30, 
2010), http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/puerto-rico/export 
-import.html. 
 64. Polk, supra note 48, at 485. 
 65. Id. at 490. 
 66. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988, 999 
(1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 55101–55122). 
 67. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. MAR. ADMIN., COMPARISON OF U.S. AND 
FOREIGN-FLAG OPERATING COSTS (2011) (examining reasons for significantly 
higher operating costs of U.S.-flag vessels and comparing costs with those of 
foreign-flag vessels); cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHARACTERIS-
TICS OF THE ISLAND’S MARITIME TRADE AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MODIFY-
ING THE JONES ACT 28–29 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653046.pdf 
(acknowledging the Jones Act “may result in higher freight rates” but claiming 
“it is not possible to measure the extent to which rates in this trade are higher 
than they otherwise would be” and concluding “the law has helped to ensure 
reliable, regular service . . . important to the Puerto Rican economy”). 
 68. Rory Carroll, The US Shipping Industry Is Putting a Multimillion 
Dollar Squeeze on Puerto Rico, REUTERS (July 9, 2015), http://www 
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the East Coast to Puerto Rico as it does to send them to the 
Dominican Republic or Jamaica.69  
The arrival of the New Deal to Puerto Rico, and, shortly 
thereafter, the entry of the United States into World War II, 
brought some respite to this stricken land.70 Sugarcane work-
ers’ wages doubled from 1940 to 1945, to a whopping thirty 
cents an hour,71 and unemployment fell from eighteen percent 
in 1940 to thirteen percent by 1950.72 This decrease in unem-
ployment was the result of direct expenditures by the federal 
government of more than $257 million from 1933 to 1942,73 an 
apparent change in policy brought about by the anticipation of 
World War II and the need to fortify Puerto Rico to protect the 
southern flank of the United States and approaches to the Pan-
ama Canal. 
Puerto Rico became a virtual military camp. The military 
expropriated vast tracks of land and eventually occupied four-
teen percent of the total land area of Puerto Rico, the greatest 
proportion of land occupied by the military in any U.S. jurisdic-
tion.74 Many military bases were located on prime agricultural 
and touristic locales. On two off-shore civilian-inhabited Island-
municipalities, Vieques and Culebra, the U.S. Navy conducted 
air and naval bombardments as well as amphibious operations 
for the next sixty years, notwithstanding decades of opposition 
by successive local administrations. In 1999, when this opposi-
tion erupted into massive civic protests after a civilian was 
killed by one of the bombing sorties, the Navy finally discontin-
ued their bombing operations—but retaliated against the local 
population by closing down all of its bases in Puerto Rico over-




 69. FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON THE COMPETITIVENESS 
OF PUERTO RICO’S ECONOMY 13 (2012). 
 70. See REXFORD GUY TUGWELL, THE STRICKEN LAND: THE STORY OF 
PUERTO RICO (1968). 
 71. TORRUELLA, supra note 6, at 237 tbl.23. 
 72. Id. at 244 tbl.27. 
 73. Id. at 239; see National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 
Stat. 195 (1933) (previously codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 
(2012)), invalidated by A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495 (1935). 
 74. JUAN GONZÁLEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF LATINOS IN 
AMERICA 252 (2000).  
 75. Puerto Rico Braces for the Base Closing, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2004), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/apr/1/20040401-123456-9250r. 
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the U.S. government refuses to adequately clean up or compen-
sate residents for the environmental, ecological, and health 
damages inflicted by the military operations.76 As legal actions 
proved unsuccessful, the residents have been left with no re-
course but to petition Congress for relief—a course unlikely to 
yield results, to put it politely.77 
The end of the Second World War and the creation of Unit-
ed Nations, with its purported anti-colonial stance codified in 
its Charter,78 opened up new prospects for many colonized peo-
ples. The United States, being a principal sponsor of the United 
Nations and of decolonization by Great Britain and France, was 
forced to publicly reevaluate its relationship with Puerto Rico 
and its U.S. citizen inhabitants. Congress took a strategic step 
in that direction in 1950 by enacting Public Law 600, which au-
thorized Puerto Ricans to draft their own local constitution sub-
ject to congressional approval.79 Congress subsequently ap-
proved, after some edits, a Puerto Rican constitution that 
afforded a limited measure of self-government,80 which included 
the right to elect a governor and legislature, as well as to ap-
point local government officials, including judges. 
What followed was a rush to the United Nations by the 
United States to seek a dispensation for Puerto Rico from U.N. 
reporting requirements imposed on those countries with non-
self-governing territories. This was accomplished by much chi-
canery and arm-twisting by the representatives of the United 
States, in collusion with some leading Puerto Rican politi-
cians,81 a feat described by some, accurately, as “a monumental 
hoax.”82 For although these actions resulted in the removal of 
 
 76. COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, CLEARING OUT WITHOUT CLEAN-
ING UP: THE U.S. AND VIEQUES ISLAND (May 19, 2011), http://www.coha.org/ 
clearing-out-without-cleaning-up-the-u-s-and-vieques-island.  
 77. See Abreu v. United States, 468 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2006).  
 78. See U.N. Charter art. 73. 
 79. Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (codified at 48 
U.S.C. § 731b (1994)). 
 80. Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-447, 66 Stat. 327. 
 81. See TORRUELLA, supra note 6, at 160–67. 
 82. El Gobernador pide a Rice que enmiende el informe sobre el estatus 
político de P.Rico, YAHOO NEWS (Nov. 19, 2007, 12:01 PM), http://web.archive 
.org/web/20080110063744/http://espanol.news.yahoo.com/s/19112007/54/eeuu 
-gobernador-pide-rice-enmiende-informe-estatus-pol-tico-p.html (“Acevedo Vilá 
aseguró que si Rice no enmienda esas conclusiones ‘debe notificar a las 
Naciones Unidas que Estados Unidos le mintió o ignoró la relación de Estado 
Libre Asociado que fue instituida en el 1953’, lo que ‘ha perpetuado un engaño 
  
94 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [100:79 
 
Puerto Rico from the U.N. colonial list, Public Law 600 was, at 
best, a cosmetic measure. We citizens of Puerto Rico continue to 
be disenfranchised nationally, unable to vote for the President 
or Vice President, or to be represented in Congress by voting 
representatives and senators, and thus have no say regarding 
the laws that apply to us. 
At about the time Public Law 600 was being enacted, the 
sugar industry finally died in Puerto Rico, a victim of the in-
creased costs of production and competition from other sugar-
producing areas.83 This formed the impetus behind “Operation 
Bootstrap,” a joint project of the federal and Puerto Rico gov-
ernments designed to create a new industrial base for the Is-
land.84 As a result of this program, Puerto Rico’s industrial base 
grew exponentially over the next forty years.  
Between 1960 and 1976, direct U.S. investment in Puerto 
Rico skyrocketed, and Puerto Rico accounted for forty percent 
of all profits by U.S. companies in Latin America.85 This bonan-
za was facilitated by special federal and Puerto Rico tax provi-
sions that partially or completely exempted U.S. corporations 
operating in Puerto Rico from taxation.86 It would be further 
fueled by Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code,87 passed in 
1976, which, with the explicit aim of creating jobs in Puerto Ri-
co and other territories, extended even greater tax incentives to 
U.S. corporations that could show the vast majority of their in-
come was derived from sources in a “possession.”88 By 1977 sev-
eral major multinational corporations were reporting that more 
than a quarter of their worldwide profits came from their Puer-
to Rico operations.89 Chemical and pharmaceutical companies 
benefited most from the Section 936 shelter: Johnson & John-
son, Smith-Kline, Merck, and Bristol-Myers alone saved bil-
lions in taxes between 1980 and 1990.90  
 
monumental’ en los boricuas, los estadounidenses y la comunidad 
internacional.”). 
 83. See MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 243–44. 
 84. Id. at 269–70, 286; see also TORRUELLA, supra note 6, at 240–41. 
 85. EMILIO PANTOJAS-GARCÍA, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AS IDEOLOGY: 
PUERTO RICO’S EXPORT-LED INDUSTRIALIZATION EXPERIENCE 115–18 (1990). 
 86. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY: PUERTO RICO AND THE 
SECTION 936 TAX CREDIT 2–3 (1993) [hereinafter PUERTO RICO AND SECTION 
936]. 
 87. I.R.C. § 936(a)(1) (1996) (repealed 1996). 
 88. PUERTO RICO AND SECTION 936, supra note 86.  
 89. PANTOJAS-GARCÍA, supra note 85, at 153. 
 90. See Kelly Richmond, Drug Companies Fear Loss of Tax Exemption, 
N.J. RECORD, Nov. 8, 1993 (on file with Minnesota Law Review). 
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But these halcyon days would come to an end as a result of 
corporate greed. Firms with high research, development, and 
marketing expenses but low production costs transferred their 
production, patents, and trademarks to subsidiaries in Puerto 
Rico to shield all revenue produced by these products from fed-
eral income taxes.91 Although these manipulations turned 
Puerto Rico into U.S. capital’s number-one profit center in the 
world, they also cost the federal government nearly $3 billion in 
lost tax revenues per year some years.92 Of course, as in the 
case of the sugar industry, little if any of the Section 936 indus-
tries’ profit remained on the Island.  
In large part as a result of the Section 936 corporations’ 
abuse of the exemption, Congress decided to do something 
about Section 936 in 1996.93 Unfortunately, instead of closing 
the loophole, Congress eliminated the provision altogether. 
This resulted in most Section 936 companies relocating to tax-
free areas such as Ireland and NAFTA-favored countries, such 
as Mexico. The corporations took the jobs they had created—
the real reason for the enactment of Section 936 in the first 
place—and any chance that Puerto Rico would recover from the 
economic havoc wrought by the sugar industry with them, leav-
ing thousands out of work and plunging Puerto Rico’s economy 
into a downward spiral. 
IV.  THE CONTEMPORARY CONSEQUENCES OF 
COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO   
In the throes of its so-called “death spiral,” Puerto Rico’s 
present economy has become even more dependent on U.S. 
transfers. The Island receives approximately $16 billion annu-
ally in U.S. government subsidies and assistance.94 But the bal-
ance of trade between Puerto Rico and the Mainland remains 
the same: About ninety percent of Puerto Rico exports go to the 
United States, and the Mainland is in turn responsible for a 
similar proportion of imports.95 The totality of this sequence of 
 
 91. See PUERTO RICO AND SECTION 936, supra note 86, at 3. 
 92. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY TAX 
BENEFITS OF OPERATING IN PUERTO RICO 14 (1992). 
 93. See Milo Peck & Helen W. Johns, The Death of Section 936: Closing a 
Loophole or Poor Policy?, 22 INT’L TAX J. 1 (1996); Angel L. Ruíz Mercado & 
Edwin Meléndez, The Potential Impact of the Repeal of Section 936 on Puerto 
Rico’s Economy: Summary, BOLETÍN DE ECONOMÍA, July-Sept. 1997, at 4, 4–10.  
 94. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND OP-
ERATING DATA REPORT 18 (2013). 
 95. See GONZÁLEZ, supra note 74, at 85, Robert Z. Lawrence & Juan Lara, 
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events, commencing with the sugar economy era to the present, 
and current state of affairs render Puerto Rico—which has con-
tributed more wealth to the United States than any country in 
history and is one of the largest captive markets of U.S. 
goods—a conduit for the federal government to subsidize U.S. 
industry, as subsidies to the Island are inevitably repatriated 
when Puerto Ricans buy Mainland-made products with these 
funds. In view of this fact of U.S. economic life, it is particularly 
ironic that Congress discriminates against Puerto Rico and its 
citizens in the parceling out of these monies.  
The discriminatory imbalance in subsidies to Puerto Rico’s 
U.S. citizens versus their Mainland counterparts is long-
standing and, unfortunately, judicially sanctioned.96 The Su-
preme Court has justified Congress’s discriminatory treatment 
of the U.S. residents of Puerto Rico in two cases—Harris v. Ro-
sario97 and Califano v. Torres98—by reasoning that “greater 
benefits could disrupt the Puerto Rican economy”!99 This is a 
conclusion that Justice Marshall understandably rejected as 
tantamount to saying that Congress meant to help the poorest 
the least and to keep Puerto Rico at a disadvantage.100  
Even today, Puerto Rico receives only a fraction of the fed-
eral support extended to Mainland counterparts.101 For exam-
ple, Puerto Rico receives little more than a tenth of the amount 
of Medicaid funding that is sent to wealthier states with simi-
lar or smaller populations.102 And in Puerto Rico, Medicare re-
imbursement rates are just sixty percent of Mainland rates; the 
same is true of Medicare Advantage.103 Overall, annual per en-
rollee spending on Medicare and Medicaid in Puerto Rico is the 
 
Trade Performance and Industrial Policy, in THE ECONOMY OF PUERTO RICO: 
RESTORING GROWTH 507, 528–31 (Susan M. Collins et al. eds., 2006). 
 96. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1308(a)(1), 1396d(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2012) 
(aid to families with dependent children); 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–306 (2012) (bene-
fits programs for the aged); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1206 (2012) (for the blind); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1351–1355 (2012) (for the disabled); 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (2012) (Sup-
plemental Social Security program for the aged, blind, and disabled).  
 97. 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (per curiam). 
 98. 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam). 
 99. 446 U.S. at 652. 
 100. Id. at 655–56 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 101. See Lizette Alvarez & Abby Goodnough, Puerto Ricans Brace for Crisis 
in Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes/com/2015/08/ 
03/us/health-providers-brace-for-more-cuts-to-medicare-in-puerto-rico.html. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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lowest in the United States.104 This situation is a major compo-
nent of Puerto Rico’s financial woes, as the local government is 
forced to cover Puerto Rico’s health care funding shortfalls to 
provide even minimal health benefits to its population.  
Prospects for climbing out of this economic hole are dim. 
Each day in Puerto Rico, eleven people or families lose their 
homes because of inability to meet their mortgage payments.105 
Almost half of the population lives below the poverty level, as 
compared to 15.5% nationally or 11% in Connecticut and 17% 
in Oklahoma,106 states that receive $56 and $38 billion respec-
tively in annual subsidies as compared to Puerto Rico’s $21 bil-
lion despite comparable populations.107 To this should be added 
that the median household income in Puerto Rico is less than 
$19,000, as compared to $70,000 and $48,000 in Connecticut 
and Oklahoma, respectively,108 and does not go nearly as far as 
income on the Mainland, given the many factors that raise the 
cost of living in Puerto Rico above that in those states.  
As previously explained, historically and presently, the 
basic fundamental problem of the Puerto Rican economy has 
always been that it is an economy that generates a significant 
amount of wealth, but retains little of it, a typical colonial cir-
cumstance.109 Puerto Rico’s principal industries—chemical, 
 
 104. Maria Levis, The Price of Inequality for Puerto Rico, HEALTH AFFAIRS 
BLOG (Dec. 29, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/12/29/the-price-of 
-inequality-for-puerto-rico.  
 105. 11 Puerto Ricans Per Day Lose Their Homes for Defaulting on Their 
Mortgages, FOX NEWS LATINO (Feb. 17, 2016), http://latino/foxnews.com/  
latino/news. 
 106. Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2014) 
[hereinafter Poverty Status], http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/ 
pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_14_5YR_S1701&prodType=table (under 
“Add/Remove Geographies,” select “State” then select “All States within the 
United States and Puerto Rico”).  
 107. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONSOLIDATED FEDERAL FUNDS REPORT FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 1 tbl.1 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/ 
cffr-10.pdf.  
 108. Median Household Income (in 2014 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars), U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (2014), http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/ 
pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_14_1YR_R1901.US01PRF&prodType= 
table.  
 109. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, supra note 69, at 4 (“In ana-
lyzing the Puerto Rican economy, we keep in mind one of its unique features: a 
substantial share of production is carried out by U.S. multinational corpora-
tions that took advantage of the sizable federal income tax benefits available 
to firms located on the Island. The repatriation of the profits of these corpora-
tions to their parent firms on the U.S. mainland, in addition to a shifting of 
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pharmaceutical, electronic, and scientific equipment manufac-
turing—are all dominated and driven by U.S.-based multina-
tional corporations, whose net profits from their Puerto Rico 
operations surpassed $14 billion in 1995 alone.110 It is the same 
story when it comes to tourism, Puerto Rico’s second-biggest 
industry, which employs nine percent of the work force, with 
almost all hotels owned or controlled by stateside capital.111 Al-
together, nearly four out of every ten dollars produced by Puer-
to Rican workers ends up in the coffers of a U.S. firm.112  
Added to this is an astonishing unemployment rate: Now 
almost twelve percent,113 it has in the last ten years crept close 
to seventeen percent and never gone lower than ten percent.114 
Puerto Rican unemployment remains five percent higher than 
that of any U.S. state,115 or even Detroit, which recently filed for 
bankruptcy under the sections of the Bankruptcy Code denied 
to Puerto Rico.116 It is as a result of these forces and phenomena 
that nearly half of Puerto Ricans live below the U.S. poverty 
level.117 And it is as a result of endemic poverty and unemploy-
ment that several waves of Puerto Ricans have migrated to 
other parts of the United States.118 The Island is experiencing 
 
income by these U.S. corporations, leads to an overstatement of the amount of 
income accruing to residents of Puerto Rico.”). 
 110. CARIBBEAN BUSINESS, THE PUERTO RICO INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO GOV-
ERNMENT RESOURCES 5, 20–21 (2007). 
 111. See id.; FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, supra note 69, at 4. 
 112. See GOBIERNO DE PUERTO RICO OFICINA DEL GOBERNADOR JUNTA DE 
PLANIFICACIÓN, Impacto del Sector Externo en la Economía de Puerto Rico, in 
INFORME ECONOMICO AL GOBERNADOR 1995, at 12 (1996), http://gis.jp.pr 
.gov/Externo_Econ/Informes%20Econ%C3%B3micos%20al%20Gobernador/ 
Informe%20Econ%C3%B3mico%20al%20Gobernador%201995.pdf. 
 113. Economy at a Glance: Puerto Rico, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, http:// 
www.bls.gov/eag/eag.pr.htm (data extracted May 20, 2016) (showing the un-
employment rate for March 2016 is 11.8%). 
 114. Local Area Unemployment Statistics: Puerto Rico, Databases, Tables & 
Calculators by Subject, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/ 
timeseries/LASST720000000000003?data_tool=XGtable (data extracted May 
24, 2016). 
 115. See Unemployment Rates for States, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/web/laus/laumstrk.htm (noting Alaska and Illinois with 
unemployment rates of 6.6%) (last modified May 20, 2016).  
 116. See Economy at a Glance: Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI, BUREAU LA-
BOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.mi_detroit_md.htm (data extract-
ed May 18, 2016) (noting an unemployment rate of 6.4%). 
 117. See Poverty Status, supra note 106.  
 118. See generally THE PUERTO RICAN DIASPORA: HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES (Carmen Teresa Whalen & Victor Vázquez-Hernández, eds., 2005). The 
first wave left shortly after the change in sovereignty; the second departed af-
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one such wave now: since 2010, more than 251,000 Puerto Ri-
cans have left the Island.119 Today, more Puerto Ricans reside 
throughout the fifty states than in Puerto Rico.120 
Given this background, it was inevitable that Puerto Rico 
would eventually face a grave fiscal crisis, one principally 
caused and perpetuated by its politically castrated condition. 
The crypto-plantation era left Puerto Rico and its population in 
an economically depressed state. Congress’s repeal of Section 
936, without providing any alternative to mitigate the result-
ant tremendous job losses, cut short the Island’s economic re-
covery; the Mainland economic recession devastated Puerto Ri-
co’s already fragile colonially-dependent economy; and finally, 
the massive exodus of Puerto Ricans seeking work elsewhere, a 
large number of whom were highly skilled and productive, vast-
ly reduced the Island’s tax base and decreased revenues. Alto-
gether, these events had a negative, multiplying effect which 
demolished the economic base of Puerto Rico and its govern-
ment. 
Unsurprisingly, Puerto Rico was left in the lurch by those 
who previously profited from the good times of the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. Although neither Puerto Rico nor any of its 
instrumentalities had ever defaulted on any debt obligations,121 
several of the rating entities, led by Moody’s, progressively de-
graded Puerto Rico bonds for the first time in their history in 
anticipation of a default.122 This had a snowball effect, trigger-
ing acceleration clauses, increasing the interest rates at which 
the government can borrow money, reducing access to capital 
markets, and further limiting the liquidity and financial flexi-
bility of these entities. The events that have followed are mat-
 
ter the Second World War and the demise of the sugar industry. We are seeing 
the third wave today. 
 119. Estimates of the Components of Resident Population Change: April 1, 
2010 to July 1, 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=PEP_2015_PEPTCOMP& 
prodType=table (data extracted May 26, 2016).  
 120. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Puerto Ricans Leave in Record Numbers for 
Mainland U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch 
.org/fact-tank/2015/10/14/puerto-ricans-leave-in-record-numbers-for-mainland 
-u-s.  
 121. Patrick Gillespie, Puerto Rico Just Defaulted for the First Time, CNN 
MONEY (Aug. 3, 2015), http:///www.money.cnn.com/2015/08/03/investing/  
puerto-rico-default. 
 122. S&P Downgrades Puerto Rico Debt to ‘CCC+’ from ‘B,’ REUTERS (Apr. 
24, 2015, 9:25 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-puertorico-sp 
-idUSL1N0XM01l20150425. 
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ters of public knowledge and need not be repeated in any detail 
here. 
The undeniable underlying fact and cause of the Island’s 
dilemma is that there is an unquestionable democratic deficit 
in the U.S.-P.R. relationship: This deficit simply cannot be seri-
ously questioned in 2016, particularly since a majority of the 
Puerto Rican electorate expressly rejected the present status in 
the 2012 plebiscite.123  
V.  CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR AN END TO 
COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO   
Beyond the patently unconstitutional nature of this coloni-
al regime, numerous international agreements that the United 
States has entered into require it to take specific actions to end 
this denigrating colonial relationship and grant political equali-
ty to all of its citizens. Leading this body of treaty law124 is the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),125 an international agreement which had been ratified 
by 104 nations by the time the United States Senate followed 
suit on April 12, 1992.126 In unambiguous language the United 
States agreed that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-
determination,” and that “[b]y virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status.”127 It also pledged that all citi-
zens “shall have” the right to vote128 and consented to the adop-
tion of whatever laws or measures could be required to guaran-
tee that right, and all others in the ICCPR.129 
 
 123. Condición Política Territorial Actual: Resumen, COMISIÓN ESTATAL DE 
ELECCIONES DE PUERTO RICO, http://64.185.222.182/REYDI_NocheDelEvento 
12/index.html#es/default/CONDICION_POLITICA_TERRITORIAL_ACTUAL
_ISLA.xml (last updated Nov. 16, 2012); Opciones No Territorialies: Resumen, 
COMISIÓN ESTATAL DE ELECCIONES DE PUERTO RICO, http://64.185.222.182/ 
REYDI_NocheDelEvento12/index.html#es/default/OPCIONES_NO_TERRITO
RIALES_ISLA.xml (last updated Nov. 16, 2012).  
 124. Others include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217 (III) A (Dec. 12, 1948); Organization of American States [OAS], American 
Declaration of Human Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX (1948); OAS, 
Inter-American Democratic Charter, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.1 (XXVIII-
E/01) (2001). 
 125. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 126. See 138 CONG. REC. S4781, S4783 (1992). 
 127. ICCPR, supra note 125, at art. 1, cl. 1. 
 128. Id. at art. 25. 
 129. Id. at art. 2, cl. 2. 
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The United States has not only failed to comply with these 
clear treaty obligations, but it has actively opposed in the 
courts any attempt to secure domestic implementation of its 
provisions. We have the most notorious example of this in 
Igartúa-de la Rosa v. United States,130 in which the First Circuit 
ruled that the ICCPR’s language does not establish that the 
treaty is “self-executing” and thus that these rights are not en-
forceable in the absence of domestic legislation to that effect. 
This is a totally erroneous conclusion, for many reasons that 
would require too much time to explain on this occasion.131 Suf-
fice it to say for present purposes that this is a conclusion that 
runs in direct contravention to the Senate’s acknowledgment at 
the time of its ratification of the ICCPR that the federal gov-
ernment was, by virtue of the ratification, bound to enforce the 
treaty.132 It is difficult to understand how a court could conclude 
that the ICCPR, replete with “shall” language, is not binding 
and self-executing. Puerto Rico’s colonial relationship with the 
United States violates not only our constitutional law, but also 
multiple international treaties that are now, by the Senate’s 
own action, U.S. law.133  
Although the Puerto Rico political establishment undoubt-
edly bears at least some part of the blame for the present fias-
co, this Article does not digress to discuss its role because, first 
of all, such an incursion would entail a discussion without any 
foreseeable end or productive result and second, more im-
portantly, because in the end, if an end could be reached, the 
answer would be, once again, that any role played by the estab-
lishment is attributable to, and dwarfed by, the principal un-
derlying cause of Puerto Rico’s problems: its colonial condition. 
While Puerto Rico’s political entities have necessarily played a 
role, theirs has not only been a limited, parochial one, but, most 
importantly, not a decisive one. Any distraction from that ulti-
mate truth, that our colonial condition is the primary cause of 
the debacle we now face, detracts from efforts to find a solution.  
 
 130. 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 131. See id. at 173–75 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
 132. “[T]he United States understands that this Covenant shall be imple-
mented by the Federal Government.” 138 CONG. REC. S4781, S4784 (1992) 
(emphasis added). 
 133. “[A]ll Treaties made or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
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There is also little doubt as to the appropriate path to end-
ing Puerto Rico’s perennial colonialism. At the risk of oversim-
plifying a problem that is hardly simple or easy to solve, I ven-
ture to suggest that what we have here is a massive civil rights 
issue, which can only be ameliorated by adopting a civil rights 
agenda, and by engaging in the types of actions that have prov-
en effective in promoting civil rights. We need not reinvent the 
wheel. There are plenty of successes from which to draw exam-
ples and inspiration. It is high time that Puerto Ricans unite 
their efforts along this front. Such a movement is, if anything, 
past due.  
I conclude with one final observation: If history teaches us 
anything, it is that extreme actions provoke extreme responses. 
Any creature, backed into a corner, will defend itself. If Con-
gress continues on its present path, if PROMESA is any reflec-
tion of Congress’s intentions with respect to Puerto Rico, legis-
lators should beware that their abusive actions do not trigger, 
more than simply civil disobedience or resistance, radicaliza-
tion and outright violence of the type that Puerto Rico saw in 
the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. There are murmurs and stirrings 
already. We must hope that Congress and others in high places 
take note and consider the potentially explosive consequences 
of what Congress is PROMESA-ing to Puerto Rico and its U.S. 
citizen population, which is, even in the context of a relation-
ship as exploitative as that of the United States with regard to 
Puerto Rico, nothing short of shocking. 
 
